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ABSTRACT 
The Automated Code Translation Tool (ACTT) was developed at Naval 
Postgraduate School to partially automate the translation Ada programs into software 
fault trees. The tool works as follows: 1 ). The Ada parser and lexical analyzer calls the 
ACTT upon recognition of an Ada statement; 2) The ACTT produces a template 
representing the statement; 3 ). The templates are linked together. 
The tool was lacking in that it only looked at a subset of Ada structures. The 
problem that this thesis addresses is the implementation of the missing language 
structures, specifically. concurrency and exception handling, to allow the ACTT to 
handle all of the ;\da structures. 
The result i-. a tool that takes the Ada source code and provides the analyst with a 
sequence of templatt>:-.. and summary information to assist in incorporating hazard 
information for );!l'llt>rating a fault tree. 
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The importance of a rigorous software testing program l:annot be overstated. As a 
rule, software systems do not work well until they have been used, and have failed 
repeatedly, in real applications. Experience has shown that errors are more common, or 
pervasive, and more troublesome, in software than in other technologies [Ref I]. In fact, 
products often fail in their first real use after being subjected to inputs and environments 
not anticipated by either the programmers or test planners. 
A. SOFTWARESAFETY 
Safety has been defined as "freedom from those conditions that can cause death, 
injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property" [Ref. 2]. 
Software safety then, can be considered as freedom from software-caused de.ath, injury, 
damage to or loss of equipment or property. A safe system is one in which every state can 
be considered safe. This is an ideal condition, yet to be achieved. All methodologies 
presently in use in software development involve humans and humans are fallible. 
A reliable system is one which, with a specified probability, will perform its intended 
function for a specified period of time under a set of specified environmental conditions. 
There is a clear distinction between reliability and safety. Reliability takes into account 
every pos~ible"'Software error, while safety is only concerned with those errors resulting in 
actual system hazards [Ref. 3]. 
With the number of software-based essential systems in transportation, industrial, 
consumer, and medical systems continually increasing, safety concerns are becoming a 
highly prevalent issue. Hardware reliability and quality have increased to the point that, the 
use of software is seen as the determining factor in any increase in the risk of error or 
failure. This is due to the complexity of software and the difficulty of validating it against 
any possible error [Ref 4]. 
Software is inherently safe in isolation, since it alone can do no physical damage. It 
can only be considered correct or incorrect with respect to the system in which it is 
functioning. Program designers must communicate with system designers (and vice versa) 
to ensure that all or at least most of the situational hazards are identified, prepared for, and 
treated by the controlling software [Ref 5]. For this reason, software and hardware must 
be treated as one entity for analysis purposes. 
Unlike hardware, where we can specify tolerance values, we cannot speak of 
sensitivity to small errors in software. A single punctuation error can prove disastrous. 
Software safety is the tip of an iceberg called sound system engineering [Ref. 6]. 
B. SOFTWARE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
The high "cost" of system errors that compromise life-critical functions prnvide~ the 
impetus for the development of tools, techniques, and methodologies that will aid in the 
identification and prevention of safety failures [Ref 7]. Engineering methodologies for 
ensuring hardware safety have enjoyed greater success than efforts for techniques to assist 
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in the development of safe software systems Some of the problems associated with safety 
verification include the difticulty of providing realistic test conditions and simulating 
hardware errors, transient faults, and system interfaces. Even when simulation is used, it is 
difficult to guarantee its accuracy 
Software safety analysis is very similar to hardware safety analysis The analysis 
requires a representation of the program logic such as a detailed design and a list of safety 
failures to be analyzed. These failures can be derived from the safety requirements. The 
analyst should be presented with a flowchart, and the design of the system on which to 
perform the analysis. The goal of the analysis is to find the failure modes or conditions 
which are or could lead to the specified safety failures, or to show that the logic contained 
in the design is not likely to produce any safety failures [Ref 8]. Techniques such as 
Software Fault Tree Analysis, Software Sneak Analysis, and Petri Net Analysis are listed 
in MIL-STD-882B [Ref 2], as software safety analysis techniques. 
I. Software Fault Tree Analysis 
Computers have replaced mechanical devices in many safety critical systems. A 
logical Stt!p toward safety in software systems is to apply existing tools wherever possible. 
One such tool is fault tree analysis. 
Fault tree analysis was developed at Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1962 by 
H.R Watson. It was designed initially to be used for safety and 1eliability studies of a 
missile system. Engineers at Boeing further developed and refined the procedures, and 
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became the method's foremost proponents as a method of performing safety analysis of 
complex electromc.. '.anical systems [Ref 9) 
A fault tree is a graphic representation of the various parallel and sequential 
combinations of faults that result in the occurrence of the predefined event These faults 
can be the result of component failures, human errors, or any other pertinent events and 
states that can lead to the hazard A fault tree illustrates the logical interrelationships of 
basic events that lead to the undesired event which is the top event of the fault tree. 
Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) assumes that the system has failed in the 
way described by hazard analysis, and works backwards to determine the set of possible 
causes for the condition to occur. Taken another way, SFTA starts from the hazardous 
outputs (or lack of them) and traces backward to find paths through the code from 
particular inputs to these outputs or to demonstrate that such paths do not exist [Ref 1 0]. 
At the root of the fault tree is the event which is to be analyzed, the loss event Necessary 
preconditions are described at the next level with either an AND or an OR relationship. 
Each subnode is expanded similarly until all leaves describe events of calculable probability 
or are unable to be analyzed for some reason [Ref 8]. 
Software fault trees are constructed using symbols from MIL-STD-8828. See 
Figure A-1. A re.::tangle is used to represent an event that requires further analysis. 
Diamond\· are used for nonterminal events, which are not developed further for lack of 
information or insufficient consequences. A circle indicates an elementary event or 
primary failure of a component not requiring further development The house is used to 
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represent normally occurring system events. f;l/ipses are used to indicate a state of the 
system that permits a fault sequence to occur. This may be a normal system state or a state 
resulting from system failure( s) A trianKle represents another sub-tree for the node which 
is not depicted on the current tree. ANJ) gates serve to indicate that all input events are 
required in order to cause the output event to occur, while OR gates indicate that any of 
the input events are satisfactory to produce the output event. These symbols comprise a 
subset of those used in hardware to facilitate integration between the hardware and 
software fault tree techniques. 
Unlike hardware fault trees where hardware components fail independently of 
one another, software component failures are typically corelated. Even with the modern 
trend towards software modularity, it is doubtful whether the analysis of software trees 
will ever be as precise as for hardware trees. SFT A though, provides direct advantages to 
software analysis. These include: 
• Provides the focus needed to give priority to catastrophic events and to determine the 
environmental conditions under which a correct state becomes unsafe. 
• Provides a convenient structure to store the information gathered during the analysis 
which can be used later for redesign. 
• The technique is familiar to hardware designers. 
• Provides a single structure for specifying software, hardware, human actions, and 
interfaces with the system. 
• AJlows the examination of the effects of underlying machine failures or environmental 
changes versus verification techniques which assume system operates correctly. 
Software Fault Tree Analysis provides extra assurance by focusing on hazards. by forcing 
a different view of the software, and by starting from different specifications [Ref 8 & 
10] 
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2. Petri Nets and Software Safety Analysis 
One technique used in software safety analysis which has not been used to 
conduct hardware analyses is Petri nets [Ref II]. Designed primarily to be used for 
system modeling, Petri nets have been used to model and analyze systems for deadlock 
and reachability. They have been applied to hardware testing problems, protocol testing, 
network test1ng, and other areas, but their application to general software testing is still in 
its infancy [Ref I2]. Using a systems approach, hardware, software, and human behavior 
can all be modeled using a single Petri net. 
A Petri net structure is a 5-tuple consisting of a finite set of places, a finite set 
of transitions, 1 an input function mapping transitions to places, an output function 
mapping transitions to places, and the initial marking for the net. A Petri net graph is a 
directed multigraph representing a Petri net structure, whose nodes are transitions and 
places. It provides a convention for mathematical modeling of discrete event· systems in 
terms of conditions and events and the relationship between them [Ref 13]. Places model 
system conditions, and transitions model the occurrence of events. See Figure A-2. 
Sequencing within a Petri net is controlled by the number and distribution of 
tokens in the net. Tokens reside in the places and control the execution of the transitions 
of the net. A Petri net executes by firing tr8nsitions. In firing, tokens are removed from 
input places and deposited in output places. The number of tokens contained in a place is 
1 The set of places and the set of transitions are disjoint. 
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called the marking of that place. The marking or state of the entire net consists of the set 
of markings of all the individual plat:es within the Petri net. See Figure A-3. 
Petri nets are an excellent analysis tool for describing and studying information 
processing systems characterized as being concurrent, asynchronous, distributed. parallel, 
non-deterministic, and/or stochastic [Ref 14J. Individual processes can be represented by 
a Petri net. A composite net, the union of Petri nets for the individual processes, can 
represent the concurrent execution ofthe individual processes. 
C. PREVIOUS WORK 
The primary goal of formal techniques for software safety analysis is to ensure that a 
software system either satisfies a particular property or exceeds some property. Because 
humans are fallible, manual techniques can lead to the introduction of errors. 
Computerized aid is mandatory if any software is to be attacked using these formal 
techniques [Ref. I 5]. 
McGraw [Ref. 16) investigated combining the methodologies of Petri Nets and 
Fault Tree Analysis for software safety analysis of an embedded military application. He 
proposed using the power of Petri nets to model concurrent systems in a multiple CPU 
environment. He concludes that Petri Net models can be applied to concurrent operations 
initially. Once the complex system is understood, Fault Tree Analysis can be used at points 
where the analyst feels that major problems are most likely to occur. 
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Gill fRef 14] presented a technique to convert and link Petri nets to fault trees and 
fault trees to Petri nets to take advantage of both analytical tools. Using Petri nets, the 
first step is to describe the system architecture. A shift could then be made to fault trees to 
describe the hazards associated with the system and the events that may lead to hazards. 
I. Failure Mode Templates 
Software Fault Tree Analysis is based on a series of templates that each map 
programming language constructs to a subtree. Cha, Leveson, and Shimeall [Ref 1 OJ 
discussed a manual method of performing SFT A for the Ada language. A software fault 
tree generated from these templates would provide a tree depicting where faults, if they 
occurred, could occur. The standard fault tree symbols discussed earlier are used in the 
construction ofthe templates. The Ada language templates are provided in Appendix B. 
2. Automated Software Safety Analysis 
Automated tools for software safety analysis provide analysts the opportunity 
to use their time more efficiently; focusing on the semantics of the analysis and not the 
syntax of the code. The existence of lexical analysis tools reduce the costs in developing 
automated tools to minimal. 
Friedman [Ref 9] described a tool to largely automate the process of 
constructing a software fault tree for a given Pascal program. The tool is designed to read 
in a Pascal program and a software caused hazard. It would then "fill in" template subtrees 
corresponding to the program's constructs. The output of the tool is an ASCII file 
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correctly formatted for TREE-MASTER, a commercial product, which can be used for 
displaying, editing, and printing the tree. 
In his study of the application of Petri net modeling for safety analysis of a 
real-time military system (arming device for a guided missile system), Hayward [Ref 13] 
determined that without the presence of automated tools, this type of analysis is 
impractical, even when applied to a small system. His paper suggests using automated 
tools during the creation of the Petri nets and to support queries for unsafe states. 
A set of Petri Net Utilities (P-NUT) was developed at UC Irvine. Lewis [Ref 
17], using these utilities and the preexisting real-time system Petri net model developed by 
Hayward, examined the feasibility of applying automated software safety analysis to 
embedded military applications. The utilities proved awkward and difficult to use. 
3. Automated Code Translation Tool 
Using tools available at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Ordonio [Ref 
18] developed an Automated Translation Tool that translates Ada code into a software 
fault tree. These tolll~ IIKiuded Aflex, an Ada based lexical analyzer, Ayacc, an Ada based 
parser generator. and Fault Tree Editor (FTE), an interactive fault tree design tool 
developed at NPS Atlc' and Ayacc were developed at the University of California, Irvine. 
The tool consists of basically four components. The first component is a lexical 
analyzer. The lexical analyzer will determine if the given input consists of valid tokens. 
The next component is a parser. It will check the given input to ensure that valid Ada 
constructs are used. The third component is a template generator that transforms valid 
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statements into templates representing possible events associated with the statement in a 
format suitable for SFT A. The final component of the tool is a file generator that will 
create a file that meets the specifications of an FTE file type. See Appendix C for a 
description of FTE file format. 
Fault Tree Editors are used to graphically display and modify fault trees. The 
Automated Translation Tool is limited to a subset of Ada structures; specifically, tasking 
and exception handling have not been addressed. 
D. TRANSPUTERS 
A transputer, derived from TRANSmitter and comPUTER is a microcomputer with 
its own local memory and with links for connecting one transputer to another [Ref. 19]. 
Manufactured by Inmos Ltd., the transputer has two special features: an on chip serial link 
for communicating with other transputers, and hardware support for timesharing. The 
transputer can be used as a single chip processor or in networks to build high performance 
concurrent systems. An overview of Flynn's taxonomy for multiple CPU systems will 
reveal where transputer systems fit in [Ref. 20]. 
Flynn picked the number of instruction streams and the number of data streams as 
classification characteristics for CPU systems. This gives us four classification groups. 
Computers with a single instruction stream and single data stream are called SISD 
computers, those with multiple instruction, single data streams are referred to as MISD 
computers. All traditional single CPU computers are SISD, while presently, there are no 
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MISD computers. The next category is single instruction, multiple data stream computers 
(SIMD). Array processors fit into this category, where one instruction unit fetches an 
instruction and then commands many data units to carry it out in parallel, with different 
data sets. Finally, multiple instruction, multiple data stream computers (MIMD). All 
distributed computer systems are MIMD. SIMD and MIMD computers are further 
subdivided into two groups: shared memory systems and distributed memory systems. 
Systems built from transputers are MIMD and use distributed memory. 
The transputer can be programmed in most high level languages, and is designed to 
ensure that compiled programs will be efficient. Transputers can also be used in single 
processor systems (SISD) as process controllers. 
Several Navy tactical systems consist of computers with multiple processors. 
Consider for example the AEGIS combat system which uses the standard ANIUYK-7 
computer with four processors. HP9000 series computers with two 68000 series 
processors are used onboard U.S. Navy submarines for Sonar Search Planning and Target 
Motion Analysis. In short time, such systems will not be able to handle the increasing 
demand for more complex software systems. Parallel processing systems are a must as the 
best high-performance uniprocessor architectures are reaching their limits [Ref. 21]. 
E. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
The development of safe systems controlled by single CPUs is a complex and not 
well understood activity. The problem of ensuring the development of a safe system 
II 
becomes even more complex and error-prone m the case of distributed computing 
systems. 
In a multitasking environment, a computer spends some unit of time (quantum) 
executing one task, switches its attention to other tasks at quantum expiration (or task 
completion), and eventually picks up where it left off on the original task if it has not been 
completed. This is referred to as interleaved concurrency. Overlapped concurrency occurs 
in multiprocessor environments, where different processors may execute different tasks at 
the same time. 
Concurrent programming then is much more difficult than sequential programming. 
Not only must consideration be given to the relative speeds of different tasks, but 
deadlock is also a key factor. Debugging and testing a concurrent program can be 
agonizing because certain errors may depend on the timing of different tasks. The timing 
of tasks can vary from one execution of the program to another, so such errors might not 
be readily reproducible Additionally, Ada programs have the property that sequences of 
statements are reentrant In other words, several tasks may execute the same sequences of 
statements at the same time. and therefore different tasks executing the same statements 
manipulate copies of any variables within the scope of the sequence [Ref 22]. 
Raising and handling exceptions in a task environment is similar to raising and 
handling them in subprograms with one important difference. If an exception were allowed 
to propagate out of a task, it would asynchronously interfere with its parent task, and in 
tum, it would be susceptible to the same kind of interference from tasks local to it. This 
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was therefore prohibited by the Department of Defense in its specifications for the Ada 
language. [Ref 23] 
The effect of raising an exception depends upon where the exception is raised; task 
declaration, task activation, during task execution, or during task communication. This 
turns out to be quite an important consideration For example, exception 
TASKING ERROR is raised only once, even if other exceptions are raised in the 
activation of many tasks. As previously stated, an exception raised in a task is not allowed 
to propagate out of a task. It can only be propagated out of a block or subprogram, but 
only after all dependent tasks have terminated. 
It has been demonstrated repeatedly, that a balance between manual and automated 
techniques in SFT A should be applied during software analysis. The introduction of the 
Automated Code Translation Tool prototype was a step towards removing a large portion 
of the effort of code translation for Ada source code. 
The initial prototype looked at only a subset of Ada structures, and as stated by 
Ordonio [Ref 18], cannot be complete until all of the Ada structures are implemented. 
This thesis implements the Ada tasking structures absent from the original prototype, and 
introduces the exception handling templates. Several additional modifications were 
accomplished to further assist the analyst. These will be discussed in Chapter II. 
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F. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter II provides a s.ummary of the development process, including modifications. 
and reasoning. It concludes with a comparison analysis of an Ada program used by Cha, 
Leveson, and Shimeall [Ref I 0]. Chapter III covers the modified tool and its application 
to the analysis of a military application. Chapter IV summarizes the research, indicating 
application and possible areas of future research. Appendix A contains background figures 
referenced in Chapter I. Appendix B contains the Ada structure templates defined by Cha, 
Leveson, and Shimeall with some modification. 2 Appendix C gives a description of the 
information required in a valid FTE file. Appendix D is the source listing for the 
application discussed in Chapter III. 
2 The first eighteen templates are reproduced from Reference 17. 
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II. DEVELOPMENT 
A. CREATION OF BASIC TEMPLATES 
To fully cover tasking in Ada, the following templates needed to be implemented: 
• entry 
• select 
• selective wait 
• select alternative 
• conditional entry 
• timed entry 
• delay 
• rendezvous 
• abort, and 
• exception. 
1. Entry Template 
Communication between tasks takes place via the actual parameters in the entry 
call, and the formal parameters in the corresponding accept statement during rendezvous. 
Entry statements without parameters are used for synchronization only. Entry families 
allow tasks to have multiple entries, that are all treated in the same manner. The entry 
index must be in the range specified in the entry family declaration. The conditions 
contributing to an entry call failure are then either a failure during the rendezvous, failure 
during parameter evaluation, or failure in the entry index. 
2. Select Template 
Three types of select statements exist: the selective wait, the conditional entry 
call, and the timed entry call. Conditional entry calls are used when an immediate 
rendezvous is desired. If the immediate rendezvous is possible, it takes place and the 
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sequence of statements following the entry are executed. If immediate rendezvous is not 
possible the alternative sequence of statements (else alternative) is executed. A timed 
entry call attempts to establish a rendezvous within a specified time. If the rendezvous is 
established within the specified ~eriod, the sequence of statements following the entry call 
are executed. If the rendezvous cannot be established with the specified period, the 
sequence of statements following the delay statement are executed. 
The selective wait statement is a bit more complicated. The selective wait 
statement gives a task the capability to: 
• accept entry calls from more than one task in a non-deterministic fashion, 
• wait only a specified amount of time for an entry call to be made, 
• perform an alternative action if no entry call is pending and 
• indicate its readiness to terminate [Ref 23]. 
It can have one or more alternatives followed by an optional else clause and sequence of 
statements. A selective _wait_ alternative can be any one of the following: 
• accept_ statement [sequence_ of_ statements ]3 
• delay_statement [sequence_of_statements], or 
· terminate. 
The presence of a terminate alternative precludes the presence of a delay statement. 
Selective wait statements containing else clauses are prohibited from containing terminate 
or delay alternatives. Thus, a select failure can be attributed to a timed entry call failure, a 
conditional entry call failure, or a selective wait failure. 
The select template has bee modified substantially from that presented in 
Reference 1 0. The three possible alternatives contributing to a select failure have been 
separated into three distinct templates (selective wait, conditional entry, and timed entry) 
1 Brackets ([ .. ])indicate optional occurrence ofthe item(s) contained within them. 
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to reduce tree expansion to only the applicable select grammar rule. An additional 
template (select alternative) was derived from the selective wait template. These changes 









Figure 2-1 Select Template 




As previously stated, conditional entry calls are used to attempt immediate 
rendezvous. Conditional entry calls are cancelled if they cannot be accepted immediately. 
To the called task, a cancellation has the same effect as if the call had never been issued. 
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The form of a conditional entry call is: 
SELECT 
entry call statement 
fsequence ofstatement.\j 
ELSE 
sequence of statements 
END SELECT; 
Failure resulting from a conditional entry call may result from a failure in, or cancellation 
of the rendezvous, or a failure during the sequence of statements. 
b. Timed Entry Template 
If it is needed to establish a rendezvous within a specified time period, a 
timed entry call is used. A timed entry call is cancelled if it is not accepted within the 
specified time period. The form of a timed entry call is: 
SELECT 
entry call statement 
I sequence of statements 1 
OR 
DELAY expression 
I sequence of statements/ 
END SELECT; 
If the entry call is not accepted within the time specified in the DELAY statement, it is 
cancelled and the sequence of statements following the DELAY statement are executed. 
Otherwise, the entry call, and the sequence of statements are executed. A timed entry 
failure may result from a failure during the rendezvous, the timeout, or the sequence of 
statements during the rendezvous. 
c. Selective Wait Template 
The selective wait statement has the following form: 
SELECT 
ACCEPT statement 
f sequence of statements 1 
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{OR 
A ( '( '.t'PT slalement 




Each of the ACCEPT statements is referred to as a select alternative and is of the form 
( when condition => I selective_ wait_ alternative 
Selective_ wait_ alternatives were previously discussed. A selective wait failure can then be 
caused by the select statement when the condition is evaluated as true, the select 
alternative, or the else sequence of statements. 
3. Delay Template 
Task execution can be temporarily suspended by use of a DELAY statement. 
The delay statement causes the executing task to remain inactive for at least the specified 
time. The task becomes eligible to resume execution upon expiration of the duration. The 
form of the delay statement is 'DELAY expression' where expression belongs to a 
predefined fixed-point type named DURATION, representing time in seconds. 
The capability may be desired for a task to perform some activity on a periodic 
basis, but also accept entry calls as they arise. A selective wait using a delay alternative 
will provide such a capability. A delay alternative is an alternative within a selective wait 
statement that begins with a delay statement instead of an accept statement. I.f not other 
alternative in the select wait is selected prior to expiration of the specified duration, then 
the delay alternative is executed . 
.. Braces ( { .. } ) indicate zero or more occurrences ofitem(s) contained within them. 
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Delay statement failures can thus be attributed to failures resulting from the task 
being delayed or evaluation of the type duration. 
4. Rendezvous Template 
Individual processes in Ada are referred to as tasks. The synchronization and 
subsequent communication between two tasks (one task is.minx an entry call and the 
other ta'\k accepting the entry call) is referred to as a rendezvous. 
Several tasks may desire rendezvous with the same task. If this condition exists, 
the rendezvous' will be queued and will occur in a FIFO order. So, at the outset, a 
rendezvous failure may occur during the rendezvous, or result from it not occurring. The 
conditions under which either of these may cause failure are straightforward .and so the 
reader is referred to the figures for the Rendezvous Template in Appendix B. 
Note the addition an exception tree to the Task aborted node. As depicted, the 
exception TASKING_ERROR will be raised if the called task completes before 
accepting an entry call or is completed at the time of the entry call, the called task 
becomes abnormal during rendezvous, or if an exception raised in the accept statement is 
not handled locally within an inner frame. [Ref 23] 
5. Abort Template 
The ABORT statement is used to stop a task, preventing it from continuing 
communication or synchronizing with other tasks, thus rendering it abnormal. Any task 
dependent upon an abnormal task also becomes abnormal. 
An aborted task does not necessarily terminate immediately. Only if a task is 
waiting at an entry call, an orcept statement, a select statement, or a delay statement will 
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it terminate immediately. Otherwise, termination will occur when the task. reaches a 
synchronization point; i.e., at the start or end of an accept statement, an exception handler 
If a task is aborted in the midst of manipulation a data structure, data may be left in an 
inconsistent state. An aborted task does not have the opportunity to deallocate variables, 
close files, etc. 
Aborting a task may result in failure if the program attempts to abort a task that 
has not yet been activated, or the task becomes abnormal while in a rendezvous. Abort 
failure may also result from task manipulation of variables during the abort. 
6. Additional Modifications 
Several record structures, modeled after those contained in the original source 
code, were added. These include a data structure for exception table records, and one for 
task entry table records. As was used in the original source for procedures and functions, 
the exception table record structure is used to keep track of all defined exceptions within 
the code, and the task entry structure is used to keep track of defined rendezvous'. 
Since the subject of this thesis is centered upon the tasking facility of Ada, it 
was decided to generate a separate fault tree per task during parsing {separate FTE file 
generated} to afford the analyst the ability to examine each task body individually. 
B. SHARED VARIABLES 
Individual processes in Ada communicate through rendezvous. It is also possible for 
two tasks to communicate through a global (shared) variable whose scope inCludes both 
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tasks. This is hazardous because it may result in race conditions. Race conditions occur 
when concurrent tasks try to manipulate the same device, or update the same variable. 
If two tasks access a shared variable, neither can assume anything about the order in 
which the other performs its operations, except at the start and end of their rendezvous. If 
the shared variables are scalar or access types the following rules must not be violated or 
unpredictable results may occur: 
• If a task reads a shared variable between two synchronization points, then no other 
task must update this shared variable between these synchronization points; other 
tasks are allowed to read the shared variable. 
• If a task updates a shared variable between two synchronization points, then no other 
task is allowed to read or update the shared variable between these tow 
synchronization points. 
Ada allows the programmer to designate the points at which a shared variable is either 
read or updated, as synchronization points through the use pragma SHARED. Pragmas 
provide the compiler with information that may affect the way a program is listed, the way 
a program is translated into machine language, or the order in which a program performs 
certain actions [Ref 22]. 
Since tasking commences at elaboration (immediately prior to begin of the main 
program) and is concurrent, those IDENTIFIERS associated with global procedures, 
functions, and variables, called or subject to manipulation by tasks are flagged for the 
analyst's consideration. 
The original source code generated templates through actions placed in the Ayacc 
(ada.y) source file. To flag IDENTIFIERs during parsing of the source, actions had to 
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added to the Aflex (ada_lex.l) source file. This is due to the consuming nature of lexical 
analyzers; the actual text is not returned to the parser, but merely the token IDENTIFIER 
Storage of the IDENTIFIERS (those associated with procedures, functions, and 
variables) and keeping track of nesting levels for monitoring visibility required the addition 
of a stack package. Each IDENTIFIER is contained within a record structure which 
contains information as to whether the IDENTIFIER is a procedure, function, task, 
variable, or representation clause. The package prevents duplicate storage of identifiers 
and provides an output of those identifiers which may be shared after each task body is 
parsed. Condition identifiers, those found in if, when, and case statements, required the 
use of a separate stack package due to the nested nature of if-then-else/elsif statements. 
C. REPRESENTATION CLAUSES 
Communication with the underlying hardware is accomplished through the use of 
representation clauses The types available are length clauses, enumeration clauses, record 
representation clauses. and address clauses. 
Representation clauses are mechanisms provided by the Ada language by which a 
program is allov.cd to nmtrol internal representations. Such representations include the 
memory address or size of an entity, the amount of storage available for dynamic 
allocation or execution of a task, and the underlying representation of particular types. 
Representation clauses, along with representation attributes, allow a program to name 
implementation-dependant values abstractly, preserving portability [Ref 22]. 
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Since IDENTIFIERs are popped from the stack when a scope IS closed, 
representation clauses are placed at the bottom of the stack to prevent them from being 
removed. Two stacks are used in the tool. A linked list was used to implement the stack 
for all identifiers except the condition identifiers. A generic stack package was used for 
storage of these. 
D. TRAFFIC LIGHT EXAMPLE 
During code development, the traffic light control system [Ref I 0] code was used 
extensively due to its tasking nature. The code appeared as follows: 
l procedure TRAFFIC is 
2 type DIRECTION is (EAST, WEST, SOUTH, NORTH); 
3 type COLOR is (RED, YELLOW, GREEN); 
4 type LIGHT_ TYPE is array(DIRECTION) of COLOR; 
5 LIGHTS : LIGHT_ TYPE := (GREEN, GREEN, RED, RED): 
6 task type SENSOR_ TASK is 
7 entry INITIALIZE(MYDIR : in DIRECTION); 
8 entry CAR_ COMES: 
9 end SENSOR_ TASK; 
10 SENSOR· array(DIRECTION) of SENSOR_ TASK: 
II task CONTROLLER is 
12 entry NOTIFY(DIR : in DIRECTION); 
13 end CONTROLLER; 
14 task body SENSOR_ TASK is 
15 DIR: DIRECTION: 
16 begin 
17 accept INITIALIZE(MYDIR: in DIRECTION) do 
18 DIR := MYDIR: 
19 end INITIALIZE; 
20 loop 
21 accept CAR_ COMES; 
22 if (LIGHTS(DIR) /= GREEN) then 
23 CONTROLLER.NOTIFY(DIR); 
24 end if; 
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25 end loop; 
26 end SENSOR_ TASK: 
27 task body CONTROLLER is 
28 begin 
29 loop 
30 accept NOTIFY(DIR: in DIRECTION) do 
3 l case DIR is 
32 when EAST I WEST => 
33 LIGIITS :==(GREEN, GREEN. RED, RED); delay 5.0; 
34 LIGIITS :==(YELLOW. YELLOW. RED. RED); delay 1.0; 
35 LIGIITS :=(RED. RED. GREEN. GREEN); 
36 when SOUTH I NORTH ==> 
37 LIGIITS :==(RED. RED. GREEN, GREEN); delay 5.0; 
38 LIGIITS :==(RED, RED, YELLOW. YELLOW); delay 1.0; 
39 LIGIITS :== (GREEN. GREEN. RED, RED); 
40 end case; 
41 end NOTIFY: 
42 end loop; 
43 end CONTROLLER; 
44 begin 
45 for DIR in EAST .. NORTH loop 
46 SENSOR(Dffi).INITIALIZE(DIR); 
47 end loop; 
48 end TRAFFIC; 
We will now analyze this code, comparing the results produced by the tool, with the 
analysis presented by Cha, Leveson, and Shimeall. 
The event analyzed was two cars traveling north and east present in the 
intersection at the same time. More specifically, a car traveling North is in the intersection 
(.entered the intersection without stopping since the light was already green), as a car 
traveling East desires to enter the intersection. The fault trees developed by Cha, Leveson, 
and Shimeall for this condition are shown in Figures 2-6 and 2-7. The fault trees 
developed by the Fault Tree Generator are shown in Appendix B (if statement template 
and rendezvous template). Figure 2-8 depicts the tool generated fault tree for lines 33-35 
which were determined by Cha, Leveson, and Shimeall to be the source of failure. 
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An analysis with the tool may have proceeded in the following manner. We first scan 
the output information produced by the tool. The first item we are informed of is that 
multiple instances a the task SENSOR_ TASK exist. We can examine the code at this point 
and see that four instances of task type SENSOR_ TASK are created (sensor. east. 
sensor.west, sensor.north, and sensor.south), one for each entrance to the intersection. 
See Figure 2-2. 
Enter input file: ---- Starting Code Translation ----
]:procedure TRAFFIC is 
2: type DIRECTION is (EAST, WEST, SOUTH. NORTH); 
3: type COLOR is (RED. YELLOW, GREEN); 
4: type LIGHT_TYPE is array (DIRECTION) of COLOR; 
5: LIGHTS: LIGHT_TYPE :=(GREEN, GREEN. RED, RED); 
6: task type SENSOR_ TASK 
**TRACK MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF TASK TYPE 'SENSOR_TASK' ** 
Figure 2-2 Multiple Task Instance Flag 
After parsing the body of SENSOR_ TASK, the tool provides a listing of 
INDENTIFIERS it has determined to be visible to the task. These are I) TRAFFIC, 
SENSOR_ TASK, and CONTROLLER; the main procedure and the two tasks, 2) 
LIGHTS, and SENSOR; global variables, and 3) MYDIR, and DIR; actual entry call 
parameters. An identical listing is output after the body of task body CONTROLLER is 
parsed. See Figure 2-3. 
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The summary information provided by the tool consists of a listing of the procedures, 
functions, and tasks, and the listing of possible interleavings (rendezvous'). See Figures 
2-4 and 2-5. 
The following IDENTIFIERS have been flagged 
as global procedures. functions, and 










Figure 2-3 Global (Shared) Variable Output 
The number of procedures, functions. and 
tasks on the table are 3 
The procedures, functions, tasks, and their 
root faults on the table are the following: 
SENSOR_TASK 
Sequence of statements caused fault 
CONTROLLER 
Sequence of statements caused fault 
TRAFFIC 
Sequence of statements caused fault 
Figure 2-4 Subprogram Listing 
We have only two subprograms to deal with, the tasks SENSOR TASK and 
CONTROLLER, so we next examine the synchronization points. We see· that entry 
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SENSOR_TASK.INITIALIZE is used only to assign a DIRECTION to each sensor, so it 
can be eliminated as a source of failure (source lines 45-47). 




Figure 2-5 Rendezvous Points 
Since the variable LIGHTS was flagged by the tool as being a shared variable, and 
due to the number of assignment statements, we first examine the body of task 
CONTROLLER. For the car traveling north to have entered the intersection without 
stopping, the condition of LIGHTS would have to be RED, RED, GREEN, GREEN. The 
code reveals that this condition exists for 5 seconds at the start of 
CONTROLLER.NOTIFY(SOUTH NORTH), and at the completion of 
CONTROLLER.NOTIFY(EAST I WEST). LIGHTS will remain in this state until another 
vehicle enters the intersection. Since we know that the vehicle traveling north entered the 
intersection without stopping, no call was made to entry 
CONTROLLER.NOTIFY(SOUTH I NORTH), so we must either be at line 35 or have 
recently completed a CONTROLLER.NOTIFY(EAST I WEST) rendezvous. 
Now looking at entry SENSOR_TASK.CAR_COMES (which makes the entry calls 
to CONTROLLER. NOTIFY) we note that there are no restrictions on when the call is 
accepted so the entry CAR_ COMES will be processed immediately. The if condition is 
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examined, and a call will be made to entry CONTROLLER. NOTIFY if the condition is 
satisfied.' More importantly, it is this if !ilatement that allows the car traveling north to 
bypass the rendezvous [Ref 10]. 
We can conclude then (as did Cha, Leveson, and Shimeall) that the hazard condition 
has the possibility of occurring if we have two successive SENSOR(EAST I WEST) 
rendezvous' with an intermediate north traveling car entering the intersection at the 
completion ofthe first SENSOR(EAST I WEST) rendezvous. 
"The null else implies no call to entry CONTROLLER.NOTIFY. 
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Sensor (N) 
at line 24 
if (lights(N) 








Figure 2-6 Sensor(North) at Line 24 
30 
Body of 




















Sequence prior to 
last caused fault 
Parameters 
cause failure 
NOTE: Unlike the ana~ysis by Clra, Leveson, and Shimea/1, the Fault Tree Generator does not 
expand the "Previous statements caused fault" node any further. Instead, it expands the "Last 
statement caused fault" node. The assignment statement of line 33 will eventually be reached by 
way of the case statement template, through expansion of the "Last statement caused fault" node. 
Figure 2-8 Tool Generated Fault Tree for TRAFFIC.A 
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III. SOFTWARE ANALYSIS 
A. SYSTEM BACKGROUND 
The Parallel Processor Based Small Tactical System Simulation was developed as 
part of The Parallel Command and Decision System (PARCDS) laboratory at Naval 
Postgraduate School. The laboratory was established in the early I 980's to support 
research for the Navy's AEGIS combat system. The Small Tactical System was modeled 
using a network of transputers, and implemented using the Ada programming language in 
conjunction with the Alsys-Ada Compiler. Produced by Alsys Limited, United Kingdom, 
this was the first compiler capable of supporting multiprocessor programming in Ada [Ref 
21]. 
The Aegis system, originally designed for the Ticonderoga class (CG-:::t7) guided 
missile cruiser, consists of a three dimensional Phase Array Radar AN/SPY -1, the 
Command and Decision system (the four processor AN/UYK-7 computer system), and a 
weapons control system. Early research at the P ARCOS laboratory involved tightly 
connected single-processor systems modeling parallel processing. The objective of the 
Small Tactical System project was to investigate the possibility of replacing the old 
standard Navy's computers for the Aegis real-time combat system aboard Naval ships with 
a network of transputers in order to reduce the reaction time of the Command and 
Decision System [Ref 21]. 
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B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The Small Tactical System functions as follows. After target detection, a dectston is 
made regarding target attacK. If the decision to attack is made, then the target is tracked. 
A future position is estimated, and a weapon is launched to intercept the target at a 
predicted intercept point. These tasks are divided among three functional subsystems, a 
Target Tracker Subsystem, a Target Prediction Subsystem, and a Ballistic Interception 
Subsystem. These three subsystems are implemented using a network of five transputers 
(see Figure 3-1 ): 
• T 0 is the host transputer which performs the Human Interaction. 
• T1 performs as the Target Tracker Subsystem. 
• T2 performs as the Target Prediction Subsystem. 
• T3 performs as the Ballistic Interception Subsystem. 
• T4 is a hot spare to make the system Fault Tolerant. 
PC 1-- TO Tl T2 
I J 
T4 T3 
Figure 3-1 The designed Small Tactical System 
The Target Tracker Subsystem code is the subject of analysis in this thesis. 
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C. GENERAL SOFTWARE DESCRIPTION 
Radar echo information contains range and bearing to a target of interest. Further 
processing of this echo information results in target motion data which may be used in 
weapons attack. The tracked data simulation should simulate this same echo information. 
The Ada code in Appendix D outputs simulated tracked positions of the target in 
three dimensions. The Prediction Subsystem requires this three dimensional data for the 
last seven position values be sent at one second interval~. The program assumes that the 
target approaches with some acceleration until it reaches its maximum speed, after which, 
all velocities remain cons tam The program provides a textual output of the positions and 
velocities of the target every second. In the actual implementation, the output data would 
instead be sent to the Prediction Subsystem using transputer communication links. 
D. SOFTWARE ANALYSIS 
Remember th<1t the basic procedure in FTA involves the assumption that the hazard 
has occurred. and no'' '" c must work backwards to determine its set of possible causes. 
Also, to summarize. the t~sult tree templates are based on the following assumptions [Ref 
10]: 
o The Ada program being analyzed is free from any syntax errors. 
o The implementation of the underlying virtual machines are perfect. 
o Templates currently refer to faults made in the program body- faulty declarations are 
not analyzed. 
o Statements such as GOTO, are difficult to analyze by a backward trace, and thus are 
not analyzed. 
The hazard event to be analyzed will be missile launched at incorrect target. 
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1. Localization 
Refer to Figure 3-2. The main objective of the Ballistic Interception Subsystem 
is to compute intercept time. It accomplishes this after first computing the intercept 
distance. 
Two of the assumptions of the Small Tactical System simulation are 1) a 
constant ammo speed, and 2) a straight line bullet trajectory. The intercept time is 
computed by dividing the intercept distance by the ammo speed. Based on the above 
assumptions, a missile launch at an incorrect target would result from an error in the 
computed intercept distance. [Ref 21] 
The Ballistic Interception Subsystem computes the intercept distance usmg 
predicted path lines input from the Target Prediction Subsystem. These path lines are 
computed from position and velocity vector inputs from the Target Tracking Subsystem. 
The Target Prediction Subsystem predicts the future position of the target .from these 
vector inputs using the Least Square Orthogonal Polynomial. Formulas used in procedures 
and functions in both the Ballistic Interception and Target Prediction Subsystems (i.e., 
Simpson's Rule, Least Square Orthogonal Polynomial) are assumed to be error free. We 
therefore narrow the source of the error to the Target Tracker Subsystem. The code for 
the Target Tracker Subsystem is contained within the procedure PROJECT. 6 
6 In the original document [Ref 19], the procedure name was PROJ vice 
PROJECT. 
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Refer to Figure 3-3 and Appendix D. Examining the body of the procedure 
PROJECT, we see that the Target Tracker Subsystem will output incorrect vector 
quantities (POSITION, VELOCITY) if: 
• the procedure GET_ VELOCITIES retrieves incorrect values, or 
• the velocity vector itself is in error. (ACCELEROMETER VEL) 
The assignment statements containing the call to the function SIMPSON are discounted, 
goiJ?g along with our assumption that all formulas used are error free. We now examine 
the code pertaining to the Target Tracker Subsystem. 
2. Isolation 
The tool produces several output files for the analyst in addition to the terminal 
output. It is recommended that the user redirect the terminal output to a file due to its 
length. The file NEW_ FTE contains the fault tree for all sections of code from the source 
file with the exception of task bodies. The tool generates a separate FTE file for each task 
body in the source code and names them sequentially, starting with TASK_BODYA. The 
terminal output contains the following information: 
• Source listing with line numbers. 
• Literal Tree Output, containing Parent node, Node, Parent Gate, and Fault for Node 
• FfE File Output, containing Node, and Fault for Node 
• Listing of procedures, functions, and tasks, and their root faults 
• List of exceptions 
• List of possible interleavings (rendezvous') 





• INITIALIZE VELOCITY 
• GET VELOCITIES 
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• ACCELEROMETER and 
• PROJECT. 
There is also one rendezvous; "START". Examination ofthe code reveals that"+" and"-" 
are overloaded functions. Simpson's Rule is used in the function SIMPSON to compute 
the position vector, and PROJECT is the main procedure. INITIALIZE_ VELOCITY, 
GET_ VELOCITIES, both procedures, and task ACCELEROMETER are contained in the 
package A TOD. 
The overloaded functions"+" and"-", and the function SIMPSON perform only the 
stated calculations, and as such may be analyzed in the same manner as discussed in 
previous works [Ref 10 & 18]. INITIALIZE_ VELOCITY is used set the initial velocity 
vector. Since th~s procedure is used to assign constant values (and we must assume that 
these values are both realistic and correct!, it can be disregarded as a contributor to the 
hazard event. GET_ VELOCITIES assigns to the variable NEW_ VEL, the contents of the 
array VEL, which contains the last five velocity vectors. The contents of this array are 
generated within the body of task ACCELEROMETER. Therefore, we must examine the 
body of the task. 
As with the traffic light example, we have again demonstrated that SFT A is very 
human-oriented. Automated tools are being developed primarily to aid in the analysis, not 
to replace the analyst. 
The rendezvous START is null, and as such, can be ignored. Since the variable 
under examination (the array VEL) is local to the package ATOD, and its manipulation 
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within the task ACCELEROMETER is being analyzed, the flagged identifiers listing 
(printed out as each task body is parsed) can be ignored. 
Looking at the code within task body ACCELEROMETER we find that there are 
only two lines that are of concern; lines 128 and 130. As in the procedure 
INITIALIZE_ VELOCITY, the assignment statement in line 130 can be ignored because it 
assigns a constant value to VEL(VELOCITIES'LAST). Now let's look at the surrounding 
code: 
125 loop 
126 delay DISP _TIME- SECONDS(CLOCK); 
127 for I in VELOCITIES'FIRST .. VELOCITIES'LAST - 1 loop 
128 VEL(I) := VEL(I + 1); 
129 endloop 
130, 131 .......... .. 
132 end loop; 
The parameterless function CLOCK is provided by the predefined package CALENDAR. 
It returns a value of type TIME representing the moment at which the function was 
·~ 
invoked. The function should return a different value each time it is called. 
It can be seen that any adjustment or correction to the system clock (or frequency 
reference) during target tracking will result in the assignment of incorrect velocities for 
that time period, which will further result in a path prediction error. See Figure 3-4 for the 
tool generated fault tree for this section of code. 
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Figure 3-4 Tool Generated Fault Tree for Delay Statement Failure 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
In it's chapter entitled, "Survey of Software Verification and Validation 
Techniques", EWICS TC7 (European Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems, 
Technical Committee 7) suggests that the effectiveness oftesting techniques depends not 
only on their proper application, but also on the procedures and standards followed in 
constructing the software [Ref 24]. The aim of this thesis was to improve upon a 
prototype tool developed to automate the testing and analysis process, and demonstrate its 
application to a concurrent real-time system. 
In this thesis, the addition of concurrency, and exception handling to the prototype 
tool developed by Ordonio [Ref 18] was accomplished. The chosen avenue of providing 
the analyst with a separate fault tree for each task body is designed to focus his attention 
on this difficult aspect of Ada programming when it exists. Additionally, the tool was 
designed to flag concurrency interaction points (those having the capability to bring about 
unexpected results). These include shared variables, representation clauses, and 
rendezvous. 
The exception handling template from Cha, Leveson, and Shimeall was added to the 
prototype, along with a modification of the original rendezvous template to include the 
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exception TASKING_ ERROR. Like procedures, functions, and tasks, exception handlers 
found in the code are provided to the analyst in a listing. 
In the traffic control system example, use of the fault tree generator provided 
immediate clues to areas of possible concern, and an ordered focus to the analysis. Use of 
automated tools is not meant to replace the analyst, but merely to remove some of the 
medial tasking. 
The Aegis simulation analysis demonstrates that as complexity of the software 
increases, the analyst's knowledge of the system is instrumental in pruning the top level 
tree. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Who should use this tool? As has been demonstrated, the first obvious candidates 
are safety analysts. A major advantage gained in using this type of tool is that it allows the 
analyst to remove himself from concerns over syntax. With the tool, a proper balance has 
been maintained between human interaction and automation, greatly accelerating the 
human analyst's task. 
Software mainlainers need be especially concerned with concurrency. Unlike 
sequential programming, a hidden danger present in concurrent programming is that a 
program may depend subtly on the relative speeds of different processes. Additionally, 
certain errors may only arise dependant upon the timing of different tasks. When shared 
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variables are involved, concurrent task manipulations may be interleaved in unpredictable 
ways. 
When software changes are made, analysis may be performed to detect new possible 
areas which may contribute to failure. The following statement is an excerpt from the 
investigation into the Therac-25 accidents: 
It is clear from the AECL (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited) documentation on 
the modifications that the software allows concurrent access to shared memory, that 
there is no real synchronization aside from data stored in shared variables, and that 
the "test" and "set" for such variables are not indivisible operations. Race conditions 
resulting from this implementation of multitasking played an important part in the 
accidents." [Ref. 25] 
Researchers may find the tool useful for three reasons: 
• As an example of development of automated analysis tools of tasking software, 
getting around the state explosion of tasking by annotating the interaction points and 
letting the human determine the appropriate interactions to explore. 
• As a basis of further research into analysis of concurrent software. 
• As a basis for automating safety-critical software, integrating other techniques with 
fault tree analysis or producing more refined templates. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Software analysis of safety-critical software is presently evolutionary vice 
revolutionary. The problems and disadvantages of program analysis have so often been 
enumerated and explained. 
• It is difficult to apply to larger programs. 
• Some program constructs are difficult to analyze. 
• It is difficult to analyze concurrent and real-time programs. 
• The method can be time-consuming and error-prone if the analysis is performed 
manually. 
• It gives no indication oftotally missed parts. [Ref 24] 
It is crucial that this evolutionary process continue. 
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In its present state, the Automated Code Translation Tool does not actually provide 
a fault tree per se, but instead, an aggregate of the templates. An important next step 
would be to provide the analyst with a 'front end' to the tool which would allow him to 
prune the tree of non-contributing branches, and generate an actual fault tree for a selected 
root fault from selected templates. This front end could also allow the analyst to integrate 
into the fault tree, information provided by other automated tools such asP-NUT. 
Gill [Ref 14] believed that Petri nets and fault trees were limited when used 
individually, but when combined, could be used quite beneficially. A potential area of 
research might involve automation of Gill's technique, with follow-on research pursuing 
the combination of that resultant work and the fault tree generator. 
With the pending release of Ada-9X, the present tool will have to be modified to 
accommodate the new grammar rules. This should prove to be a relatively simple task. 
Ada-9X will also provide several new features to the language. These include but are not 
limited to: 
• Object-oriented programming with run-time polymorphism. 
• Access types have been extended to allow an access value to designate a subprogram 
or an object declared by an object declaration. 
Additional support for interfacing to other languages. [Ref 26]. 
The tool can also be used as a model for the development of automated tools for 
other languages. C/C++ for example, have a process-based rather than thread based model 
of concurrency. Also, exception handling is dealt with much differently in C (and proposed 
for C++), in that the language allows for the resumption of processing at the point the 
exception was raised. 
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AND GATE OR GATE 
Figure A-I Common Software Fault Tree Symbols 
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Circle represents a place 
Bar represents a transition 
Directed arcs connect the places and the transitions. 
t1 
tl 
Transition tl is an input tv 
place pi 
•---•• Transition t I is an output of 
place pi 
Figure A-2 Petri Net Symbology 
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A transition is enabled if each of its input places has at least as many 
tokens in it as arcs from the places to the transition A transition may 
fire only if it is enabled 
Transition t 1 is enabled 
t2 
J--..... 1 Transition 12 is enabled 
t3 
,__.,1 Transition t3 is not enabled 
tl tl 
0 0-FO 
tl enabled After t 1 fires 
Figure A-3 Petri Net Execution 
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APPENDIX B: ADA STRUCTURE TEMPLATES 
Sequence of Statements Template 
Last Statement 
Caused Fault 
Sequence or Statements 
Caused Fault 
Last Statement Did 
Not Mask Fault 
Previo~a Statements 
Ca~aed Faull 
Sequence Prior To Last 
Statement Caused Fault 
* Sequence of statements template was not depicted in the 
works of Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
so 
Chanae in Value 
C'aiBed Faull 
Assignment ]emplate 
Assignment ('Ia use 
C'aused Fault 





* There is no difference between the tool generated Assignment Template 
and the Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall template. 
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~-----------------------r~l 11~·------------------------~ I I I 




If CondiUon True 
True Condition on f 
r 1 












All Conditions False 
,---------------~=====·T~ ~-·-----. I I 
E'lllllualion of Elslf 



















Sequence of Statements 
Caused Fault 
* The Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall template did not distinguish between the 
"ir' associated nodes and the "elsir' associated nodes, but the tool generated 






r-----------~====~1 T~----------------~ I I I 
Loop Never Executed Loop Condition Evaluation 
Caltied Fault 
r-----"J 1~...-_ __, I I 
Wrong Type Of J.uup I \HI lleration Scheme 
Caused Fault 








· Nth Iteration 
Caltied Fault 
I 
Sequence of Statements 
Caused Fault 
I 
Condition True at 
N. I Iteration 
Condition True Past 
N • I Iteration 
I 
Sequence cl Statements 
Kept Loop Condition 
True 








* The tool generated Loop Template distinguished between the different types 
of loops and expanded the associated "condition" nodes and the Leveson, Cha 
and Shimeall template did not. 
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No Other C011dillon 
True 
Case Template 
























ca .. edFault 
Previous Alternative 
Caused Faull 
* The tool generated Case Template physically placed the "Other's Clause 
Caused Fault" and associated nodes on a lower level then the Leveson, Cha, 
and Shimeall template, nevertheless, the two templates are equivalent. 
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* The tool generated Procedure Call Template added the node 
"Procedure Elaboration Caused Fault" to the template from 
Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
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*The Function Call Template was not depicted in the works 
of Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
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Block of Statements 
Caused Fault 
1 Block Name Optional) 
Exception Propaaatecl 
ExceptioniSI Caused Fault 
Exception N Other Exception(s) 
Caused Fault CaiBed Fault 
Block Body 
Caused Fault 
* The tool generated Block Statement Template elaborated more 
on the "Exception Caused Fault" node then did the works of 
Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
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* There was no difference in the Raise Template between the tool 
generated and the Levesoc, Cha, and Shimeall templates. 
~---------------------------------------------------------------------------. .. -
Djyjsjon and Multjpljcatjon Template 
Enlualion of Len Term 
CamedFault 
Dlvision/Mulllpllc:atlon 
EXpression Camed Full 
Evaluation or"/" or "•" 
Caused Fault 
Operator~ I Dhi.ion by Zero . _ 
Evaluallon of Right Termts) 
Caused Faull 
* Division I Multiplication Template was not depicted in the works 
of Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
Addjtjoo apd Subtraction Template 
Evaluation of Len Term 
Caus..cl Fault 
Addilion/Subtraclion 
Expression Caused Fault 
Et111uaUonof"+"or "·" 
Caused Fault 
Evalualion of Right Termls) 
Caused Fault 
Term(s) and'or Operators 
* Addition I Subtraction Template was not depicted in the works 
of Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. · 
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Len or Prior Relation Right Relation 
Caused Fault Caused Fault 
~ 
And RelaUon(sl Relation 
* And Relation Template was not depicted in the works of 
Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
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And Then Relation Template 





Left or Prior Relation 
Caused Faull 






Left Relation True 
Evaluation or Right 
Relation Caused Fault 
Relation 
* And Then Relation Template was not depicted in the works of 
Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
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1 r • 
I l 
Len o:r Prior Relation Rl&ht Relatiun 
Caused Fault Caused Fault 
Or Relatlon(s • Relation 
* Or Relation Template was not depicted in the works of 
Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
Or Else Relation Template 
Left or Prior Relalion 
Caused Fault 
Or EIS¥ Relalion 




( .. ~I 
~----~~~ '----~ I I 
Len Relalion False 
Evalualion or Right 
Relalion Caused Fault 
Relation 
* Or Else Relation Template was not depicted in the works of 
Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
M 
Evaluation of Left 







(=./=.. <, >, <=, >=l 
Evaluation or RighJ 
Expression Caused Fault 
* Relation Template was not depicted in the works of 
Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 







Caused Faull Caused Faull 
_6. 
Rtlalion(s) 
* Index Component Template was not depicted in the ~orks of 
Leveson, Cha, and Shimeall. 
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Range Template 










Right Simple Eltpression 
Caused Fault 
* Range Template was not depicted in the works of Leveson, 


















































(see next figure) 
Else sequence of 
statements 
causes failure 
* The Cha, Leveson, and Shimeall select template contained 
and AND gate vice an OR gate at this location. 
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Condition true and Failure caused 
select alternative by other 
causes failure alternative 
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Conditional Entry Template 
Rendezvous 
causes failure 










* This node was added to more accurately reflect the Ada 
grammar. 
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Called task in 
alternative 
rendezvous 
Rende~vous Template (coot) 
An exception can he raised in a task durin~ a rendezvous or when 
attemptin~ a rendezvous. The situations resultin~ in raising an 




~-------._ ______ . __ 
Called task 
becomes abnormal 
Task complete during 








APPENDIX C: FTE FILE INFORMATION 
The fault tree files that can be . _ad by the Fault Tree Editor (FTE), and that FTE writes 
have the following characteristics: 
line I: label string 
line 2: fault string 
line 3: file string 
line4: start line integer 
end line integer 
-




n children integer 
Line 4 has seven fields seperated by any whitespace except a newline. An FTI:. rile consists 
of a series of the above four line groups, one group for each node. In addition the nodes 
must be ordered in "preorder" fashion to be understood by FTE. The best way to see this 
is to create a simple fault tree using FTE and then look. at the file generated. An example 
of a single node follows: 
Label: "Top" 
Fault: "This program will always fail" 
File: "teste" 
start line: I 
end line: 55 
-
x coord: 200 
y coord: 300 
type: I 
gate: 0 
n children: 0 
The above node would look like: 
Top 
This program will always fail 
test.c 
l 55 200 300 I 0 0 
in the FTE file saved 
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APPENDIX D: PROJECT.A SOURCE LISTING 
--The original source code with'd and instantiated a generic_elemental)'junctions package 
-- available in the Alsys-Ada Compilation System. The code as fallows was 
-- compiled and executed using both SunAda and Meridian Ada compilers without 
--error. 
with text_io. calendar: --with genenc_ elementary Junctions 
use text_ io. calendar: 
procedure PROJECT is 
--package MATH _FUNCT is new GENERiC_ ELEME\'T.4R Y_FUNC'TJON.)'(FLOA 1J; 
--use MATH_FUNC'T: 
package FLOAT_INOUT is new FLOAT_IO(FLOAT): 
use FLOAT_ INOUT: 
--Type identifications 
type COMPONENT is (X.Y.Z); 
type VECTOR is array (COMPONENT) of FLOAT: 
type VELOCITIES is array (0 .. 4) of VECTOR; 
DELTA_ TIME: constant FLOAT:= 0.25: 
--delta time T= 1/4 seconds 
NO_ TARGET : BOOLEAN := FALSE: 
CURRENT :constant INTEGER:= 4; 
LINT_SEC :INTEGER: 
INTERVAL : DAY_DURATION := 1.0; 
DISP _TIME : DAY _DURATION := 0.0: 
POSITION : VECTOR := (27000.0.22000.0.5000.0): 
INT _VEL : VECTOR := (230.0.180.0,25.0): 
VELOCITY : VELOCITIES: 
function "+" (LEFT. RIGHT : in VECTOR) return VECTOR is 
-- This function is written to handle VECTOR addition. 
begin 
end"+": 
TEMP : VECTOR: 
TEMP(X) := LEFT(X) + RIGHT(X): 
TEMP(Y) := LEFT(Y) + RIGHT(Y): 
TEMP(Z) := LEFT(Z) + RIGHT(Z): 
return TEMP: 
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function"-" (LEFT. RIGHT: in VECTOR) return VECTOR is 
--This function is written to handle VECTOR subtraction. 
begin 
end"-"~ 
TEMP : VECTOR~ 
TEMP(X) := LEFT(X) - RIGHT(X)~ 
TEMP(Y) := LEFT(Y) - RIGHT(Y)~ 
TEMP(Z) := LEFT(Z) - RIGHT(Z)~ 
return TEMP~ 
function SIMPSON (XPOS : in VECTOR~ 
VEL : in VELOCITIES) return VECTOR is 
-- This function performs numeric integration using 
-- Simpson's Rule and returns a position vector given 
--a set of sample VELOCITIES. 
begin 
T: VECTOR~ 
I : COMPONENT: 
J : INTEGER~ I 
for I 111 COMPONENT loop 
end loop 
return ., 
T(ll ·= (VEL(VELOCITIES'FIRST) (I)+ VEL (VELOCITIES'LAST) (I))~ 
for J 111 VELOCITIES'FIRST + 1.. VELOCITIES'LAST - I loop 
if (J MOD 2) = J then 
T(l) := T(I) + 4.0 * VEL(J) (I): 
Ttl> := T(I) + 2.0 * VEL(J) (I); 
~.:nd 11. 
~.:nd loop. 
T 1 It DELTA_ TIME * T(l) I 1 0; 
end SIMPSO~. 
package A TOD I' 
--This packa)!c 1, used to maintain the velocity values for the 
-- prev1ous ~c.:ond al I:~ second intervals (five values). It has 
--one funcllon \\lu,;h returns an array of vectors. The task is 
-- written to handle concurrent processing of ACCELEROMETER. 
procedure INITIALIZE_ VELOCITY(FIRST _VEL : in VECTOR): 
procedure GET_ VELOCITIES(NEW _VEL : out VELOCITIES): 





package body A TOD is 
VEL : VELOCITIES :=(others=> (others==> tl.ll)): 
procedure INITIALIZE_ VELOCITY(FIRST _VEL . in VECTOR) is 
I: INTEGER: 
begin 
for I in VELOCITIES'RANGE loop 
VEL(l} :=FIRST_ VEL: 
end loop; 
end INITIALIZE_ VELOCITY: 
procedure GET_ VELOCITIES(NEW _VEL : out VELOCITIES)is 
begin 
NEW_ VEL := VEL: 
end GET_ VELOCITIES: 
task body ACCELEROMETER is 
use CALENDAR; 
begin 
INTERVAL: constant DURATION:== 0.25; 
DISP_TIME: DURATION:= 0.0: 
LINT_SEC: INTEGER:= O: 
accept START do 
null: 
end START: 
LINT _SEC := INTEGER(SECONDS(CLOCK)): 
DISP_TIME := DURATION(LINT_SEC): 
while DISP _TIME < SECONDS(CLOCK) loop 
DISP _TIME := DISP _TIME+ INTERVAL: 
end loop: 
loop 
delay DISP _TIME - SECONDS( CLOCK): 
for I in VELOCITIES'FIRST.. VELOCITIES'LAST -1 loop 
VEL(I) := VEL(l+l): 
end loop: 
VEL(VELOCITIES'LAST) := VEL(VELOCITIES'LAST) + 
(0.012.0.0098.0.00275): 





procedure PUT _POSITION_ VELOCITY (XP : in VECTOR: 
VEL : in VECTOR) is 
begin 
SET_COL(2): 
PUT(XP(X). FORE => 6. AFT => ..J. EXP => 0): 
PUT(""); 
PUT(XP(Y). FORE => 6. AFT => 4. EXP => 0): 
PUT(""): 
PUT(XP(Z). FORE=> 6. AFT=> ..J. EXP => 0): 
PUT(""): 
PUT(VEL(X). FORE => 6. AFT=> 4. EXP => 0); 
PUT(""): 
PUT(VEL(Y). FORE => 6. AFT => ..J. EXP => 0); 
PUT(""); 
PUT(VEL(Z), FORE => 6. AFT=> 4. EXP => 0): 
NEW_LINE: 
end PUT_POSITION_ VELOCITY: 
begin -- main program 
ATOD.INITIALIZE_ VELOCITY(INT_ VEL}; 
LINT_SEC := INTEGER(SECONDS(CLOCK)): 
DISP_TIME := DURATION(LINT_SEC) + 0.8: 
ATOD.ACCELEROMETER.START: 
while NO_ TARGET = FALSE loop 





delay (DISP _TIME- SECONDS(CLOCK)- 0.02): 
ATOD.GET _ VELOCITIES(VELOCITY); 
PUT _POSITION_ VELOCITY (POSITION, VELOCITY(CURRENT)): 
POSITION := POSITION - SIMPSON(POSITION. VELOCITY): 
DISP _TIME := DISP _TIME+ INTERVAL; 
NO_ TARGET := TRUE: 
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